



VEYRUM ROBOTICS STANDARD

**VRS-GEN-101**

IR Category: Safety Incidents

Scoring basis, safety criteria SF-1...SF-10, evidence by tier and determination procedure for the safety intrinsic category.

VEYRUM RESEARCH INSTITUTE

DOCUMENT

VRS-GEN-101

VERSION

1.0

STATUS

Draft

DATE

15 September 2026

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Foreword. IR Category Standard for **safety** — the heaviest-weighted category of the Intrinsic Rating (category weights live in the VRS-GEN-005 master and its data twin, never here). This edition scores the category as a **sum of integer points** across ten safety criteria (SF-1...SF-10, 100 points; Clause 6), each earned against a plain-language ladder and bounded by an evidence tier — Unverified, Verified or Certified (Clause 7). It supersedes the rate-based model of the 0.x drafts: no formula, no statistical blend, no qualitative bands. Requirements use “shall”.

1 Introduction

A robot’s safety is the single most loss-relevant fact about it. This Standard turns “how safe is this model?” into a repeatable number by asking ten questions — has the maker identified its hazards, are its protective functions rated, does the machine reach a safe state on command and on failure, does it hold up at its declared limits, and what has actually happened in the field — and awarding integer points for each. The points sum to a category total of 0–100. What a robot can earn is bounded by how well its evidence is substantiated: public documents alone reach the **Unverified** ceiling, a manufacturer evidence pack reaches the **Verified** ceiling, and a witnessed demonstration reaches the **Certified** ceiling. The category rewards safety that is designed in *and* shown, not safety that is merely asserted.

2 1 Scope

1.1 This Standard defines, for the **safety** intrinsic category: what the category measures (Clause 4); the scoring basis (Clause 5); the ten criteria SF-1...SF-10 with their point ladders and tier ceilings (Clause 6); the evidence admissible at each tier (Clause 7); the determination procedure (Clause 8); a worked example (Clause 9); and the assessor checklist (Clause 10).

1.2 The category shall be assessed at one of three **tiers** — Unverified, Verified, Certified — and each criterion states the maximum points reachable at each tier. The category tier is the tier whose evidence bar the assessed evidence meets (Clause 8). An Application Rating tier shall not exceed the Intrinsic Rating tier.

1.3 This Standard excludes category weighting and aggregation into the Intrinsic Rating (VRS-GEN-005 §6), sector re-weighting (the sector -201 protocols) and the evidence-grade definitions (VRS-GEN-012). It does not itself assign the Intrinsic Rating.

3 2 Normative references

- **VRS-GEN-001**, Vocabulary and Terminology — robot and safety-function terms.
- **VRS-GEN-005**, Intrinsic Rating — Methodology — point aggregation, tiers, cold-start parity and the company-wide fallback rule (§6).
- **VRS-GEN-009**, Robot Risk Passport and Registry Schema — the record that carries the category result (Clause 8).
- **VRS-GEN-012**, Evidence Grades and Data Requirements — evidence kinds and the tier evidence bars.

- **ISO 10218-1:2025 / ISO 10218-2:2025**, Robotics — Safety requirements (industrial robots; robot applications) — hazard vocabulary and safety-function classes (absorbs ISO/TS 15066:2016).
- **ISO 3691-4:2023**, Industrial trucks — Driverless industrial trucks and their systems.
- **ISO 13482:2014**, Robots and robotic devices — Safety requirements for personal care robots (in revision; cite the edition in force at assessment).
- **ISO 12100:2010**, Safety of machinery — General principles for design — Risk assessment and risk reduction (hazard, hazardous event and harm definitions).
- **ISO 13849-1:2023**, Safety of machinery — Safety-related parts of control systems — Part 1: General principles for design (performance level, PL).
- **IEC 62061:2021**, Safety of machinery — Functional safety of safety-related control systems (SIL).
- **OSHA 29 CFR Part 1904**, Recording and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses — severity vocabulary for field-safety records.

4 3 Terms and definitions

Terms per VRS-GEN-001 and ISO 12100:2010 (hazard, hazardous situation, hazardous event, harm).
Locally:

- **safety function** — a function whose failure increases risk (ISO 10218-1 / ISO 13849-1 vocabulary: protective stop, speed and separation monitoring, power and force limiting, hand guiding, emergency stop), with a rated performance level (PL, ISO 13849-1) or safety integrity level (SIL, IEC 62061).
- **safe state** — the declared state the machine enters on command or on a detected fault, in which hazardous motion has stopped and energy is held or removed as declared.
- **incident** — a hazardous event in which the robot's behaviour or state was a contributing factor and which caused harm, or would have but for chance or an independent safeguard (a near-miss).
- **tier** — the evidence stringency at which the category is assessed: **Unverified** (public evidence only), **Verified** (manufacturer evidence pack examined), **Certified** (behaviour witnessed).
- **ceiling** — the maximum points a criterion can award at a given tier; points earned are capped at the ceiling of the assessed tier.
- **evidence bar** — the minimum evidence a criterion requires before any points are awarded; below it the criterion scores 0.
- **company-wide fallback** — where model-specific evidence is unavailable, the substitute points a criterion allows from manufacturer-wide evidence (VRS-GEN-005 §6); marked in the criterion row.
- **certificate rung** — a ladder step earned by a publicly verifiable third-party certificate (registrar entry or certificate number) in lieu of a witnessed demonstration.

5 4 What this category measures

4.1 The category measures the model's **safety**: the completeness of its hazard analysis, the architecture and rated performance of its safety functions, its behaviour at declared limits and under degraded conditions, its stability and mechanical protections, its software change control, its independent-assessment coverage, and its field-safety record and remediation conduct.

4.2 It measures both **design and evidence and record**: whether a protective function exists and is rated (SF-1...SF-3, SF-7), whether it performs at the declared limits and fails safe (SF-4...SF-6), whether an independent body has assessed it (SF-8), and what has happened in service (SF-9, SF-10). A criterion is scored only to the tier its evidence supports.

4.3 The category shall be assessed at **model** granularity (manufacturer + model + declared major variant). Evidence shall not be pooled across models that differ in safety-relevant hardware or safety-software version unless the manufacturer declares them one model for safety purposes and evidence supports that declaration.

6 5 Scoring basis

5.1 The category score shall be the **sum of integer points** awarded across the ten criteria SF-1...SF-10 (Clause 6). The maximum is 100 points. There is no rate formula and no statistical blend; the point range of each criterion sizes its importance. Aggregation of this total into the Intrinsic Rating, tier rules and the cold-start parity and company-wide fallback rules are defined once in VRS-GEN-005 §6 and are not restated here.

5.2 Each criterion awards points against a **ladder** of rungs, highest first, decidable by inspection, measurement, test or documented evidence (VRS-GEN-002 §7.1). The assessor shall award the highest rung the evidence supports.

5.3 Each criterion states three **ceilings** — Unverified, Verified, Certified. Points earned shall be capped at the ceiling of the tier at which the criterion's evidence is assessed. A criterion may reach a higher tier than another; the category tier is recorded per Clause 8.

5.4 Each criterion states an **evidence bar**. Where the bar is not met the criterion scores **0**; no evidence is 0 points, never a null or a discard.

5.5 A criterion marked **not applicable by class** for the model's form (Clause 6 Applicability row) is excluded from the score and from the totals; the reachable maximum is reduced accordingly and recorded (Clause 8). For the safety category all ten criteria apply to all classes.

5.6 Where a criterion offers a **company-wide fallback**, manufacturer-wide evidence may earn the stated fallback points when model-specific evidence is unavailable (VRS-GEN-005 §6); the substitution shall be recorded.

7 6 Criteria

6.0 Summary. Points and tier ceilings per criterion; totals reproduce by addition.

§	CRITERION	POINTS	UNVERIFIED CEILING	VERIFIED CEILING	CERTIFIED CEILING
6.1	SF-1 Risk assessment completeness	0–8	7	8	8
6.2	SF-2 Safety-function architecture and rated performance	0–12	8	9	12
6.3	SF-3 Emergency stop and safe-state behaviour	0–10	6	6	10
6.4	SF-4 Primary protective function at declared limits	0–18	8	11	18
6.5	SF-5 Degraded-condition and fail-safe behaviour	0–10	6	6	10
6.6	SF-6 Stability and mechanical hazard protections	0–8	5	5	8
6.7	SF-7 Safety-related software change control	0–6	5	6	6
6.8	SF-8 Third-party safety assessment coverage	0–10	8	10	10
6.9	SF-9 Field safety record	0–12	8	12	12
6.10	SF-10 Field safety notice and remediation conduct	0–6	5	6	6
Total		100	66	79	100

7.1 6.1 SF-1 Risk assessment completeness (0–8)

ROW	
What is measured	Hazard identification and risk reduction per ISO 12100 (or sector equivalent) covering the hazard types relevant to the form (contact, crush/trap, struck-by, fall/tip, uncontrolled motion, failure-to-stop, unexpected restart, pinch/shear, electrical, thermal, hazardous release); residual risks communicated to users.
Ladder	8 = all relevant hazards, measures, residuals communicated · 7 = publicly evidenced only (no pack, no demonstration) · 5 = most · 2 = partial · 0 = absent
Unverified — evidence & ceiling	Manual warnings, published residual-risk statements. Ceiling 7.
Verified — evidence & ceiling	Risk assessment document (redaction allowed). Ceiling 8.
Certified — evidence & ceiling	— (documentary). Ceiling 8.
Company-wide fallback	n/a
Evidence bar	A dated risk assessment exists for the rated revision.
Applicability	All classes

7.2 6.2 SF-2 Safety-function architecture and rated performance (0–12)

ROW	
What is measured	Each hazard in SF-1 is addressed by a declared safety function with a rated performance level / SIL (ISO 13849-1 / IEC 62061) appropriate to the hazard.
Ladder	12 = every hazard covered, all functions rated and third-party-assessed · 9 = covered and rated · 8 = publicly evidenced only (no pack, no demonstration) · 5 = covered, ratings partial · 2 = functions listed, no ratings · 0 = none
Unverified — evidence & ceiling	Datasheet safety features, DoC standards list. Ceiling 8.
Verified — evidence & ceiling	Safety-function specification + third-party reports/certificates. Ceiling 9.
Certified — evidence & ceiling	Declared functions shown to exist and act (e-stop, protective stop, interlocks). Ceiling 12.
Company-wide fallback	n/a
Evidence bar	Safety-function list declared.
Applicability	All classes

7.3 6.3 SF-3 Emergency stop and safe-state behaviour (0–10)

ROW	
What is measured	Every declared e-stop device halts motion into the declared safe state; safe state holds power/brakes as declared; reset requires deliberate action; low-energy and charging states are safe.
Ladder	10 = all shown · 8 = e-stop/safe-state functions certified by an accredited third party (publicly verifiable certificate, e.g. PL/PFHd per function) · 6 = shown for primary device / validation report · 3 = documented only · 0 = not established
Unverified — evidence & ceiling	Manual; public certificate. Ceiling 6.
Verified — evidence & ceiling	Safety-function spec + validation report; certificate. Ceiling 6.
Certified — evidence & ceiling	Witnessed e-stop from each device; safe state on feed; energy/charging interlock. Ceiling 10.
Company-wide fallback	n/a
Evidence bar	E-stop architecture declared.
Applicability	All classes

7.4 6.4 SF-4 Primary protective function at declared limits (0–18)

ROW	
What is measured	The declared primary protective function (protective stop on detection / SSM / PFL / geofence / lost-link fail-safe — whichever the form relies on) performs at the declared maximum speed, payload and worst declared operating condition.
Ladder	18 = all declared limits witnessed · 12 = two · 11 = pack-evidenced (documents), not demonstrated · 8 = function certified by an accredited third party with published performance data (stopping time/distance, PFHd) · 6 = nominal only · 3 = conformity to the anchor regime declared (DoC), no performance results · 0 = not established
Unverified — evidence & ceiling	Public third-party test; public certificate; DoC. Ceiling 8.
Verified — evidence & ceiling	Functional-safety validation at limits; certificate. Ceiling 11.
Certified — evidence & ceiling	Witnessed at each declared limit with claim-sized apparatus. Ceiling 18.
Company-wide fallback	n/a
Evidence bar	Limits declared numerically.
Applicability	All classes

7.5 6.5 SF-5 Degraded-condition and fail-safe behaviour (0–10)

ROW	
What is measured	Behaviour under sensor obscuration, worst declared lighting/weather, loss of communication link, and power loss: the declared safe state is entered every time.
Ladder	10 = all four witnessed · 6 = three witnessed, or all four documented and independently tested/certified · 3 = documented only · 0 = not established/unsafe
Unverified — evidence & ceiling	Manual statements; public third-party tests. Ceiling 6.
Verified — evidence & ceiling	Validation evidence for degraded conditions. Ceiling 6.
Certified — evidence & ceiling	Witnessed obscuration, lost-link, power-cut. Ceiling 10.
Company-wide fallback	n/a
Evidence bar	Degraded conditions and fail-safe behaviour declared.
Applicability	All classes

7.6 6.6 SF-6 Stability and mechanical hazard protections (0–8)

ROW	
What is measured	No tip at declared max payload on declared max slope/step; pinch, crush and entrapment protections act on a test object; release possible without power.
Ladder	8 = all shown · 5 = stability + one protection · 2 = documented only · 0 = not established
Unverified — evidence & ceiling	Datasheet/manual. Ceiling 5.
Verified — evidence & ceiling	Test evidence (stability, force/pinch tests). Ceiling 5.
Certified — evidence & ceiling	Witnessed stability at limits; protections on test object. Ceiling 8.
Company-wide fallback	n/a
Evidence bar	Stability limits declared.
Applicability	All classes

7.7 6.7 SF-7 Safety-related software change control (0–6)

ROW	
What is measured	Safety-related software/firmware is identified, its changes logged, and the rated version is stated.
Ladder	6 = full history, safety changes flagged, version-tagged · 5 = publicly evidenced only (no pack, no demonstration) · 3 = release notes only · 0 = untracked
Unverified — evidence & ceiling	Public release notes. Ceiling 5.
Verified — evidence & ceiling	Safety software change history for rated range. Ceiling 6.
Certified — evidence & ceiling	From Verified evidence. Ceiling 6.
Company-wide fallback	n/a
Evidence bar	Rated version declared.
Applicability	All classes

7.8 6.8 SF-8 Third-party safety assessment coverage (0–10)

ROW	
What is measured	Independent assessment of the declared safety functions / whole machine, by kind of third party (F23).
Ladder	10 = accredited test laboratory or certification body covers the whole machine or all functions (e.g. TÜV/UL certificate with per-function data) · 8 = notified-body / regulatory conformity assessment of the machine (EU class mark, CE under MDR, UL 1740 listing) · 6 = regulator clearance or registration of the model (e.g. FDA 510(k)), or major functions certified · 3 = safety components certified only · 0 = none. Certificates must be publicly verifiable (registrar entry, certificate number)
Unverified — evidence & ceiling	Public certificate registers / class marks / clearance databases. Ceiling 8.
Verified — evidence & ceiling	Certificates + reports. Ceiling 10.
Certified — evidence & ceiling	From Verified evidence. Ceiling 10.
Company-wide fallback	n/a
Evidence bar	None (0 is a valid result).
Applicability	All classes

7.9 6.9 SF-9 Field safety record (0–12)

ROW	
What is measured	Severity-weighted incidents (GEN-101 classes) per 1,000 units per year over the declared window, robot-contributing only.
Ladder	12 = none above near-miss · 9 = minor only, all remediated · 8 = publicly evidenced only (no pack, no demonstration) · 6 = medical-treatment/lost-time all remediated · 5 = public regulator/recall/incident databases searched with recorded coverage, none found, no model-specific exposure available (null-result rung) · 2 = any unremediated below major · 0 = any unremediated major. Regime rule (F19): where a mandatory public incident-reporting regime covers the model (sector protocol declares — e.g. medical MAUDE/recalls, aviation occurrence databases), the Unverified ceiling is the full 12
Unverified — evidence & ceiling	Regulator/recall databases, verified press (12 under a public regime). Ceiling 8.
Verified — evidence & ceiling	Model-specific incident register + exposure. Ceiling 12.
Certified — evidence & ceiling	From Verified evidence. Ceiling 12.
Company-wide fallback	Company-wide register → 9
Evidence bar	Exposure figures declared (model or company), or a null-result search recorded.
Applicability	All classes

7.10 6.10 SF-10 Field safety notice and remediation conduct (0–6)

ROW	
What is measured	Safety notices issued promptly when needed; corrective actions closed; users informed.
Ladder	6 = timely notices + all actions closed (evidenced), or no notices required and none found in public databases with recorded coverage (null-result rung, U ceiling) · 5 = publicly evidenced only (no pack, no demonstration) · 3 = notices issued, closure partial · 0 = known issues without notice. Regime rule (F19) as SF-9
Unverified — evidence & ceiling	Public notices/recalls (6 under a public regime). Ceiling 5.
Verified — evidence & ceiling	Notice register + corrective-action closure. Ceiling 6.
Certified — evidence & ceiling	From Verified evidence. Ceiling 6.
Company-wide fallback	Company-wide → 5
Evidence bar	None.
Applicability	All classes

8 7 Evidence by tier

7.1 Unverified. The assessor works only from evidence anyone can obtain without the manufacturer's cooperation: datasheets and manuals, published declarations of conformity and their cited standards, public certificate registers and class marks, and — for the field-record criteria — public regulator, recall and incident databases and verified press. Each criterion's Unverified ceiling is the most an honest reading of such evidence can earn; the category tier is **Unverified**.

7.2 Verified. The assessor additionally examines a manufacturer evidence pack: the risk assessment, the safety-function specification with PL/SIL ratings, functional-safety validation reports, third-party test reports and certificates, the safety-software change history, and the model-specific incident register with its exposure figures. Verified ceilings apply only to criteria whose pack items are present and examined; the category tier is **Verified**.

7.3 Certified. The assessor witnesses the declared behaviour: e-stop from each device into the safe state, the primary protective function at each declared limit with claim-sized apparatus, degraded-condition and fail-safe responses, and stability and mechanical protections on a test object.

Documentary criteria (SF-1, SF-7) and record criteria (SF-8, SF-9, SF-10) carry their Certified points from the Verified evidence. The category tier is **Certified**.

7.4 Certificate rung. Where a criterion names a certificate rung (SF-3, SF-4, SF-8), a publicly verifiable accredited third-party certificate — identified by registrar entry or certificate number — earns the stated rung without a witnessed demonstration; an unverifiable certificate shall not.

7.5 Field-record regime rule. For SF-9 and SF-10 the reachable Unverified ceiling depends on the reporting regime the model operates under. Where a **mandatory public incident-reporting regime** covers the model — declared by the sector protocol (e.g. medical device reports and recalls, aviation occurrence databases) — the assessor may treat the public record as complete and the Unverified ceiling is the full criterion range. Where no such regime applies, a recorded **null-result search** of the public databases, with its coverage stated, earns the criterion's null-result rung. A search that is not recorded shall not earn it.

7.6 Company-wide fallback. Where a criterion offers a company-wide fallback (SF-9, SF-10) and model-specific evidence is unavailable, manufacturer-wide records earn the stated fallback points (VRS-GEN-005 §6); the substitution shall be recorded per Clause 8.

9 Determination procedure

Step 1 — Fix the tier and applicability. Record the tier at which each criterion is assessed (Clause 7) and, per 5.5, the set of any not-applicable criteria; for the safety category all ten apply.

Step 2 — Award points. For each criterion, the assessor shall award the highest ladder rung the evidence supports (Clause 6) and shall **cap** the award at the ceiling of that criterion's assessed tier (5.3). Where the evidence bar is not met, the award shall be 0 (5.4).

Step 3 — Record substitutions. Where a company-wide fallback is used (SF-9, SF-10), record the substitution and the fallback points (7.6).

Step 4 — Sum. The category score shall be the **sum of the capped per-criterion points**. With no not-applicable criteria the reachable maximum is 100; otherwise it is 100 minus the ranges of the excluded criteria, and this reachable maximum shall be recorded alongside the score.

Step 5 — Record the tier reached. The category tier is the lowest tier among the criteria that determined the score (a score resting on any Unverified criterion is an Unverified-tier result).

Step 6 — Output and passport binding. Record, for the model's Robot Risk Passport safety-category record (VRS-GEN-009): the category score, the per-criterion points, the ceiling reached and tier for each criterion, the not-applicable set and reachable maximum, and the company-wide substitutions, so that an underwriter or lender can reproduce and audit the score from the passport alone. The per-criterion points carry the **frequency and severity** loss drivers; residual value, recoverability and obsolescence are the finance drivers of **economics_residual** (VRS-GEN-107) and **serviceability** (VRS-GEN-103) and shall not be inferred from this score.

10 9 Worked example (fictional model)

“Northline AMR-7”, a warehouse AMR, assessed at the **Verified** tier: a manufacturer evidence pack is examined but no behaviour is witnessed. All ten criteria apply (reachable maximum at Verified = 79).

§	CRITERION	RUNG EARNED	VERIFIED CEILING	POINTS
6.1	SF-1	8 (all hazards, measures, residuals)	8	8
6.2	SF-2	9 (covered and rated; third-party reports in pack)	9	9
6.3	SF-3	6 (spec + validation report)	6	6
6.4	SF-4	11 (functional-safety validation at limits, not witnessed)	11	11
6.5	SF-5	6 (validation evidence for degraded conditions)	6	6
6.6	SF-6	5 (stability + pinch test in pack)	5	5
6.7	SF-7	6 (safety-software change history for rated range)	6	6
6.8	SF-8	10 (accredited certificate + reports)	10	10
6.9	SF-9	9 (minor only, all remediated; model register + exposure)	12	9
6.10	SF-10	6 (notice register + corrective-action closure)	6	6
Total			79	76

The safety-category total is **76 of a reachable 79** at the Verified tier. Two points are lost at SF-9 (one remediated minor-incident history rather than a clean record) and at SF-2 (one hazard’s function rated but not yet third-party-assessed, which the pack’s ceiling of 9 already bounds). To reach the SF-4 rung of 18 or the SF-3 rung of 10 the model would have to be assessed at the Certified tier, where the primary protective function and each e-stop device are witnessed. The score, the per-criterion points, the ceiling and tier reached for each criterion, and the empty not-applicable set are recorded to the passport (Step 6).

11 10 Assessor checklist

- [] Model granularity confirmed and safety-software version scope declared (4.3).
- [] Assessment tier fixed per criterion; not-applicable set recorded (Step 1); reachable maximum recorded.

- [] **SF-1** risk-assessment completeness scored; a dated risk assessment exists (evidence bar).
- [] **SF-2** safety-function architecture and PL/SIL ratings scored; function list declared (evidence bar).
- [] **SF-3** e-stop and safe-state behaviour scored; certificate rung applied only if publicly verifiable (7.4).
- [] **SF-4** primary protective function at declared limits scored; limits declared numerically (evidence bar).
- [] **SF-5** degraded-condition and fail-safe behaviour scored.
- [] **SF-6** stability and mechanical protections scored; stability limits declared (evidence bar).
- [] **SF-7** safety-related software change control scored; rated version declared (evidence bar).
- [] **SF-8** third-party assessment coverage scored (0 is valid).
- [] **SF-9** field safety record scored; regime rule and null-result rung applied per 7.5; exposure or null-result search recorded.
- [] **SF-10** notice and remediation conduct scored; regime rule per 7.5.
- [] Company-wide substitutions recorded (Step 3; 7.6).
- [] Each award capped at the assessed-tier ceiling (5.3); no-evidence criteria scored 0, never null (5.4).
- [] Score, per-criterion points, tier and ceiling reached recorded to the passport (Step 6).

12 Bibliography

- ISO 10218-1:2025 and ISO 10218-2:2025, *Robotics — Safety requirements — Part 1: Industrial robots; Part 2: Industrial robot applications and robot cells* (absorbing ISO/TS 15066:2016).
- ISO 3691-4:2023, *Industrial trucks — Safety requirements and verification — Part 4: Driverless industrial trucks and their systems*.
- ISO 13482:2014, *Robots and robotic devices — Safety requirements for personal care robots*.
- ISO 12100:2010, *Safety of machinery — General principles for design — Risk assessment and risk reduction*.
- ISO 13849-1:2023, *Safety of machinery — Safety-related parts of control systems — Part 1: General principles for design*.
- IEC 62061:2021, *Safety of machinery — Functional safety of safety-related control systems*.
- ANSI/RIA R15.08-1-2020, *Industrial Mobile Robots — Safety Requirements — Part 1*.
- OSHA, 29 CFR Part 1904, *Recording and Reporting Occupational Injuries and Illnesses* (2024 edition).
- UL 3300:2022, *Outline of Investigation for Service, Communication, Information, Education and Entertainment (SCIEE) Robots*.

13 Change history

DATE	VERSION	STATUS	CHANGE	AUTHORITY
2026-09-15	1.0	Draft	VRS 2026 rewrite: replaced the rate-based scoring (input schema, incident coding, exposure, window/recency/credibility, rate formula, qualitative level descriptors) with ten point-scored criteria SF-1... SF-10 (100 points; Clause 6) with per-tier ceilings; added Clause 5 Scoring basis, Clause 7 Evidence by tier (certificate rung, null-result rung, field-record regime rule, company-wide fallback), Clause 8 point-sum determination and passport binding, regenerated worked example (Verified tier) and assessor checklist; retired confidence bands, provisional flags, renormalisation, class/dataset medians, credibility blend, cold-start/GEN-201 dependency and qualitative IR levels; dropped GEN-201/GEN-202 references and the calibration/statistics bibliography that served the rate model; see GEN-005 §6	VRS 2026 rewrite Stage 4
2026-09-11	0.3	Draft	ACTUARIAL review: added passport binding and loss-driver/decision-mapping table; anchored to CAS Ratemaking Principles (2021) and ASOP No. 25	ACTUARIAL run #20
2026-09-10	0.2	Draft	Expanded to publishable depth: input schema, incident coding, exposure rules, window/recency/credibility/reporting-regime/remediation rules, 8-step procedure with anchor-derived scale prior, worked example, assessor checklist	CEO direction 2026-09-10
2026-09-05	0.1	Draft	Split from VRS-GEN-005 §5.1; level descriptors added per the category-standard wireframe	CEO goal 2026-09-05

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